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US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke gave an interesting speech at the 
London School of Economics in mid-January. Unusual for speeches by the head of a 
major central bank, Bernanke was fairly direct in his message and coherent in his 
analysis. He also gave some insights into what seems to be his actual thinking. If he 
does mean what he said, then this speech could be of significance for the world 
economy - and also of interest in Japan. 
 
The Bank of Japan has for almost twenty years insisted that it did not have the tools to 
end the banking-bust depression, could not help the deflation, was basically powerless, 
and that it depended on some structural reform that was supposed to be implemented 
by others - the government in particular. By contrast, Bernanke emphasized that the 
Fed had the tools available to battle the financial and economic crisis, and was using 
them without delay. 
 
Bernanke has written about Japanese deflation and the policies of the Bank of Japan 
in his academic writings and has sharply criticized the Bank of Japan for its inaction 
and for allowing a banking crisis to be transformed into a multiyear economic 
downturn and depression. 
 
Bernanke explained what he had written in his analysis of the Bank of Japan's policy 
many years ago in his lecture, namely that a central bank could eventually boost asset 
prices by creating money and putting it into circulation through purchases of assets 
and direct lending, and could in this way support and stimulate the economy. He used 
the term quantitative easing, which had become well known in the context of the 
Bank of Japan. Indeed, it is a term that was originally used in Japanese (ryoteki 
kanwa) in the early 1990s by critics of the Bank of Japan. 
 
I have been one of the main users of this term because I wanted to contrast such 
needed policy from traditional ways of monetary stimulation or the monetarist way of 
referring to boosting the money supply. I wanted to emphasize that using the price 
mechanism of interest rates was not likely to help and therefore quantitative monetary 
policy of a different kind was required. 
 
What's wrong with the BOJ? 
 
While the expression quantitative easing had been mainly used by Bank of Japan 
critics, this changed in 2001 when the Bank of Japan proclaimed it would try what 
critics had then been demanding for almost a decade - one can't fault the bank for 
rushing into new things ... Thus in March 2001, the Bank of Japan announced it was 
officially going to change its monetary policy by switching from its alleged use of 
interest rates to adopting quantitative easing (later using the term ryoteki kanwa and 
translating this as quantitative easing in its English announcements). 
 However, the Bank of Japan's use of this term created much confusion because the 
policy it adopted in 2001 and many subsequent years was not the true quantitative 
easing that I had demanded. The quantity that needs easing is the quantity of credit 
creation. This is necessary and sufficient for a recovery in a situation like this. The 
Bank of Japan, however, chose to merely increase the reserves of banks held at the 
central bank. This is a traditional monetarist policy prescription, which boosts a 
measure called high powered money, but the measure is pointless. I had warned many 
times that this was likely to fail. 
 
What good does it do the economy if banks deposit more money in the central bank? 
More credit creation is needed. That can only come from the central bank or through 
the normal route - from commercial banks through the extension of bank loans. But 
the Bank of Japan failed to boost credit creation. Thus its quantitative easing policy 
failed. As a result of this failure, the Bank of Japan's leaders would in the following 
years give speeches stating that the critics had been proven wrong. They would claim 
they tried quantitative easing as critics recommended, and it failed! 
 
However, we witnessed only the tatemae (facade) of quantitative easing, not the 
honne (actual fact). Before 2001, the Bank of Japan did not actually want to reflate 
the economy. As Bank of Japan leaders have said on the record, they were quite 
happy about the recession because they used it to put pressure on the government to 
change laws and introduce US-style deregulated free-market capitalism. 
 
Despite its official conversion to quantitative easing in 2001, this stance did not 
change. The central bank kept the quantity of credit creation tight. Thus, despite the 
nominal rise in high-powered money, the economy remained mired in recession. 
There was a brief recovery in 2006 - and again this is a case in point - it was based on 
a temporary recovery in credit creation. However, this policy was reversed by the 
Bank of Japan as soon the first shoots of recovery had become visible and Japan has 
been heading back into deflation ever since. One can only hope that the Bank of Japan 
will follow former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan's recent example and admit that the 
current global crisis has disproved and discredited the deregulated free-market model. 
 
Monetize fiscal policy 
 
What is interesting about the Fed's current policies is that there seems to be some real 
- in the correct meaning of the term - quantitative easing going on. Credit creation by 
the Fed is ballooning. This is done by direct purchases of assets by the Fed and by 
direct lending by the Fed. The Fed has now also started to purchase mortgage-backed 
securities. It seems that Bernanke is not using smoke and mirrors. What he says seems 
to be what he actually thinks and plans to do (his honne) - quite a revolutionary 
approach to central banking. 
 
Many observers and experts are currently wondering whether the world is now going 
to go down the road that Japan has traveled over the past eighteen years - a road that 
includes rising unemployment, deflation, falling asset prices and a shrinking economy. 
The potential for this to occur exists because the credit bubbles in Britain, Ireland, 
Spain, the United States and a number of other countries operated on the same 
mechanics as the Japanese bubble economy of the 1980s. Excessive credit creation 
used for speculative purposes drove up asset prices, but it was predictable that it all had to turn into bad debts, busting the banking system and resulting in a credit-crunch 
recession. 
 
The policy response taken by the key central bank may be where the parallels end. 
The current measures taken by the Fed and their scale are unusually aggressive and 
contrast sharply with the policies adopted by the Bank of Japan since 1991. The Fed 
also is monetizing fiscal policy, while the Japanese central bank has so far refused to 
do so. Thus at present, one can say that the US economy is likely to recover far more 
quickly than the economies of other countries, notably Japan. Where central banks 
continue to let credit creation stagnate, and where they refuse to monetize fiscal 
policy, economies will continue to shrink. At the moment, this includes Japan and 
Britain. 
 
The British government's fiscal stimulation has been entirely unfunded, which means 
that all the government bonds issued to fund it have deprived the banking system of 
liquidity. Hence bank lending will continue to slow. For Britain and other post-bubble 
economies such as Ireland and Spain, we must expect a long slump, perhaps even on a 
Japanese scale. But that depends on the goals of the respective central banks. 
 
One lesson we should learn is that there should be more public debate about the role 
of central banks in creating the current global crisis and the role they should play from 
now on. Over the past thirty years, central banks worldwide have become more 
independent from governments and parliaments. Yet, despite their increased power, 
macroeconomic performance has deteriorated and the world has seen an unusually 
large number of banking and economic crises. 
 
In almost all cases, the crises were due to bubbles caused by excessive credit creation 
for speculative purposes - something I had warned needed monitoring and restricting 
by central banks. But the central banks chose to let credit creation rip. Only if the goal 
of central banks had been to create and exacerbate business cycles could we say that 
they have done a good job. 
 
It seems clear, therefore, that the topic of central bank independence should be 
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